Gender, language attitudes, and language status in Ukraine

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ABSTRACT

This article examines gender and language in post-Soviet Ukraine, where language laws and turbulent socioeconomic changes are affecting language use. It discusses ideologies of gender, language, and ethnicity in Ukraine and assesses the significance of gender in shaping stances toward three competing languages, Ukrainian, Russian, and English. The analysis focuses on language ideologies and attitudes, based on survey and matched-guise language attitude test data. Two kinds of explanations for the gendered patterning are considered: first, how socialization and cultural ideologies of women’s relationship to language shape the attitudes documented; and second, how political/economic forces (differences in possibilities for social power and social advancement linked to language use) lead men and women to benefit from different strategies in their use and valuation of linguistic capital. It is shown that, while sociocultural and political/economic forces reinforce each other in some cases, in others they contradict each other, with economic motives prevailing over cultural paradigms of traditionalism. (Language attitudes, language status, gender, ethnicity, matched-guise test, Ukraine.)*

INTRODUCTION

When I mentioned to a Ukrainian colleague my plan to study gender as a factor shaping language use, he wrote me that most other linguists in Ukraine would see this research question as “something exotic, American gimmicks, or the contrivances of over-satiated imperialists.” Nevertheless, in recent years interest in gender studies has begun to grow in Ukraine (e.g., see Petrenko, Isajev, & Petrenko 1999, Ahejeva & Oksamytna 2001).¹

Transformations in discourses and practices of gender and language have played a major role in the changes under way in post-Soviet societies. Numerous studies have documented each factor separately (e.g., on language, Fierman 1991, Arel 1993, Bilaniuk 1998a, Laitin 1998, Smith et al. 1998, Janmaat 1999; on gender, Bohachevs’ky-Chomiak 1998, Funk & Mueller 1993, Pavlychko 1996, Pikhingen 1996, Rubchak 1996; and in Eastern Europe, Verdery 1996, Gal & Kligman 2000); in this article, however, I examine the interrelationship between language...
and gender in Ukraine. My analysis focuses on gender differences in language ideologies and attitudes. To explain the gendered patterning, I consider how socialization and cultural ideologies of women’s relationship to language shape the documented attitudes. I also consider how differences in possibilities for social power and advancement that are linked to language use lead men and women to benefit from different strategies in using and valuing language. I show that, while sociocultural and political/economic forces reinforce each other in some cases, in others they are in contradiction, with individual economic motives prevailing over cultural paradigms of traditionalism.

Although this study is unique in the post-Soviet context, it builds on research conducted elsewhere on the linkages among gender, language, and social status. Prior research analyzed the use of phonological or grammatical variables (as reviewed in Cameron & Coates 1989 and Labov 1990), and also attitudes and language/dialect choice in multilingual/multidialectal contexts (e.g. Gal 1979, 1998, Woolard 1989, 1996, Nichols 1998, Beckford Wassink 1999, Herbert 2000). It is the latter angle that I develop here, to compare the gendering of ideologies of the different “labeled” languages (Ukrainian, Russian, and also English), as well as attitudes toward variation within these languages, by considering evaluations of purity, standardness, and regional specifics.

Through my focus on ideologies and attitudes, I examine the psychological forces that shape language use and underlie constructions of gender and ethnic identity in Ukraine. I analyze both conscious and subconscious language attitudes, which I studied by means of survey questions and a matched guise language-attitude test in 1995 in various areas in Ukraine. A matched guise test is based on the premise that people take on a different guise when speaking a different language, and that they associate certain qualities with a language itself. The survey and test responses document enacted attitudes, evidence of stances by which people align themselves in communities of practice (Holmes & Meyerhoff 1999). Although these stances may now be shifting, the patterns revealed have allowed me to study the social forces shaping language use and other symbolic behavior. My analyses show how the Ukrainian case is consistent with the findings and explanations put forth by other researchers, and how a combination of different methods can illuminate our understanding of the dynamics of language and gender.

Before proceeding, my use of the terms “gender” and “sex” require explanation. “Sex” refers to a biological category, implying an “objective” binary male-female difference; “gender” refers to the embodied social and cultural ideologies of how biological sex should be manifested. In my research, I did not gather any unmediated information on “sex,” which would be impossible without clinical studies. My data consist of the self-identifications of my respondents or my own observations of people as they presented themselves in social contexts. Even when checking off whether they were female or male, respondents were enacting an ideology of gender. Thus, I predominantly use the term gender throughout this paper, with the exception of discussions of
data based on the binary survey designations. Because it is common in the 
sociolinguistic literature to use the term “sex” when referring solely to a binary 
survey category, I continue this practice here, with the understanding that this 
“sex” is also the result of cultural construction.

Research in language and gender has revealed a widespread tendency for 
women to adhere more to overtly prestigious language forms, while men tend to 
use more vernacular or low-prestige forms; women have also been shown to be 
more progressive in linguistic innovation (Labov 1990). These tendencies (and 
exceptions to them) are rooted in the social, cultural, and economic conditions 
that affect the different valuation of linguistic resources and people’s strategic 
choices in using them. Here I examine the extent to which these tendencies are 
evident in the turbulent linguistic situation in post-Soviet Ukraine, where lan-
guage laws and socioeconomic changes are transforming language use.

In seeking to explain the gendered variation in language, I draw on the analy-
sis put forth by Penelope Eckert in her studies of midwestern US schoolchildren. 
Eckert 1998 suggests that women’s social positions are defined more through 
symbolic means than by their skills or activities, which leads females to seek 
more symbolic capital via language use. This is also argued by Bourdieu 1991. 
This argument is developed further in studies that show that women’s status and 
social/ethnic identity is more dependent on display of community membership 
This is not to say that men are free from symbolic definition; for example, Trudg-
ill 1974 has argued that men in the British city of Norwich use more local non-
standard forms because these forms have “covert prestige” and are symbolically 
associated with the constructs of “masculinity” and “toughness.” It remains to be 
shown whether, in a given case, men are less constrained by symbolic capital than 
women are, or if differences in language use reflect differences in how language 
forms are valued by each gender, depending on the symbolic construction of 
social opportunities.

The value of language as symbolic capital is closely linked to an individu-
al’s control of material capital. Deuchar 1989 and Brown 1998 analyze the 
greater use of forms of politeness by women as a result of their socially dis-
empowered position relative to men; correspondingly, Baran & Syska 2000 
link the increase in use of “coarse” and nonstandard language by women in 
contemporary Poland to the recent economic empowerment of women there. 
The importance of economic factors in the gendering of language use is also 
argued by Gal 1979, 1998 and Nichols 1998, who show that women’s language 
choice is shaped by their struggle for higher social and economic status in 
seeking job or marriage opportunities. Gal 1979, Eiskovits 1998, Nichols 1998, 
and Beckford Wassink 1999 also highlight the importance of the factor of age, 
which intersects with gender and economics in shaping language use. I draw on 
the reasoning proposed by these researchers in my own explanations of 
gendered language patterning in Ukraine.
I begin with an overview of the context of language politics and gender in post-Soviet Ukraine. Next, I explain my approach in analyzing language and gender, based on data gathered during fieldwork in 1995. In my first analysis, I consider people's stances of linguistic criticism and how these are shaped by gender, ethnicity, urban/rural background, and regional background. Then I examine the subconscious associations of languages with personal qualities, as documented by my matched guise test. I analyze how both the gender of respondents and the gender of the readers being evaluated affect linguistic attitudes. The data show remarkable consistency in gendered patterning, for which I propose explanations linked to the social and ethnic tensions in a rapidly changing society.

THE LANGUAGE SITUATION IN UKRAINE: ETHNICITY

Ukrainian was officially designated the state language of Ukraine in 1989. The legislation making Ukrainian official was one of the first legal steps towards de-Sovietization and independence of the country in 1991. This legal step went against a long-established diglossic relationship between Ukrainian as a “low, peasant” language, and Russian as the “high, cultured” language. This change in language policy accompanied other social and political changes and served to disrupt linguistic values in general.²

During my fieldwork, I found that the correctness of words and pronunciations had become hotly contested in interactions as people negotiated authority. Language choice and language quality became foci of discussion in newspapers, on television and radio, and on the street. Books, brochures, and television and radio programs attacked what they defined as incorrect usages and promoted “correct” forms (e.g., Lenets 1993, Serbens’ka 1994, Hanitkevych 1995, Hnatkevych 2000). Interviews reported in newspapers sometimes commented on the incorrectness of the language of those interviewed (e.g. Anon. 1995, Halabudra-Chyhryn 1995). Once, at an outdoor arts and crafts market in Lviv, I was surprised to hear two women arguing not over the price of a necklace but over the proper word for ‘silver’ in Ukrainian – serebro or sriblo (the latter is considered standard Ukrainian, while the former is closer to Russian, although it was pronounced according to Ukrainian phonology). These disputes constituted a struggle over social authority. The books and television programs aspired to define a prestigious Ukrainian language, while in daily discussions people struggled to assert their social position by demonstrating control of the “correct” language. In these processes, the legitimacy and value of various linguistic forms were being redefined, and thus access to power was being reconfigured.

To understand the significance of the change in language values, we need to consider the history of language politics in Ukraine. In the past, Ukraine (as defined by its current borders) has been fragmented and dominated by neighboring regimes. As one journalist put it, Ukraine has had “an identity crisis lasting...
centuries,” and it has “long been the booty of warring European dynasties” (Perlez 1994). In the current territory of Ukraine, there has been a long history of various official (non-Ukrainian) languages, including Polish, Russian, German, and Romanian, which were administratively imposed by the governing regimes. During Russian tsarist rule in the mid to late nineteenth century, there were decrees overtly banning any publications or public uses of Ukrainian. Although Soviet linguistic policies were usually more covert, carried out under the banner of internationalism, they generally continued to suppress the Ukrainian language (and other non-Russian languages) in favor of Russian.

Under the Soviet regime, Russian was imposed forcefully and also attracted people by the privileges associated with it. Not only was it politically reprehensible to not know and use Russian (except for peasants), but Russian language was required for access to good education and decent jobs. Ukrainian predominated in rural areas, but even there all students had to study Russian in school, and Russian tended to be highly regarded. A twenty-year-old man whom I interviewed told me that when he moved to Kyiv as a child, he was ridiculed for his Ukrainian language, but he was seen as a lider (‘leader’) when he returned to his village later, speaking Russian. This high regard was not universal, however: An elderly village woman told me that she inserted Russian words into her speech to please Russian outsiders, but that she did not really care for it. Some villagers and urbanites told me that they resented the high status of Russian – but they all agreed that in the Soviet era, Ukrainian was publicly held in low regard. At best, Ukrainian was favored as a language for singing, and it was seen as appropriate for use in folkloric venues, like other non-Russian republic languages. Otherwise, people used Ukrainian at home and in rural areas, but there was a widely held view that it had no future and would die out as Russian ascended to its destiny as a world language.

Now that the Soviet Union has disintegrated, the future spread and dominant role of Russian are no longer secure. Nevertheless, Russian is still a politically powerful presence, a lingua franca of the post-Soviet regions, and its cultural prestige remains strong – a situation that the Russian government is trying to maintain. In February 2000, it issued statements opposing a law that would further promote the official use of Ukrainian in Ukraine, stating that this infringed on the rights of Russian speakers (Maksymiuk 2000). There is also some concern that English might replace Russian as a lingua franca. English borrowings and syncretic Ukrainian-English forms are becoming increasingly widespread in daily usage (Azhniuk 2001). Indeed, many schools in Ukraine no longer teach the Russian language at all, and English teachers are in high demand. When I arrived at one rural school in the Lviv region to conduct research, people who had not been informed of my purpose confessed that they had hoped that I was an English teacher finally being sent to them.

As I will show, the different historical and demographic trajectories in various regions of Ukraine have lead to differing language ideologies. I will compare data
from Lviv, Kyiv, and Dnipropetrovsk. Lviv, in the western part of the country, did not experience as severe repression of Ukrainian language as did the central and eastern regions, since it was never within the Russian tsarist empire, and it did not become part of the Soviet Union until after World War II. Since independence, western Ukraine has witnessed vigorous public support for Ukrainian language. Kyiv (Kiev), as the capital of the country and seat of government, was both the focus of intense Russification during the Soviet era, and more recently under much scrutiny as to the implementation of laws promoting the official status of Ukrainian. Kyiv now also has the largest presence of foreign agencies and businesses, and hence of foreign language influences. In Dnipropetrovsk, in the eastern, highly industrialized part of the country, there is a relatively greater proportion of ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians who consider their native language to be Russian, and there is more overt resistance to the promotion of Ukrainian language. It is rare to hear Ukrainian-speakers in the Dnipropetrovsk urban area who are not clearly peasants.

**BLURRING CATEGORY LINES: SURZHYK AND PERCEPTIONS OF IMPURITY**

“Ukrainian” and “Russian” are categories that encompass much complexity, reflecting regional, generational, demographic, and other factors, as well as specific influences in people’s personal histories. Both “Ukrainian” and “Russian” refer to standardized languages, and there is speech that falls close to a standard and is unequivocally labeled. However, there are also speech practices that blend features from both standards (see Bilaniuk 1997b; Strikha 1997; Laitin 1998:144–6; Flier 2000; Radchuk 2000; Trub 2000). Languages that people perceive as being mixed or impure are called surzhyk, generally a derogatory term. Today the term surzhyk is not limited to regularized mixed forms (syncretic language varieties developed as Ukrainian-speaking peasants moved to urban areas and tried to speak Russian). People also use the term to criticize someone who might borrow a term from Ukrainian into Russian, or who speaks with an “accent.” This negative label is often used as a weapon in the symbolic struggle for validity and correctness.

The attention to correctness reflects a growing concern with purity in language. The resurgence of purism is likely a response to the ambivalence of having a previously peasant language become a state language. With a focus on purity, people can separate a valuable variety of Ukrainian from “debased” forms. If Ukrainian were to become a highly prestigious language, it would have to be a pure Ukrainian. As a professor of journalism in Lviv stated in an interview, “We need a king’s Ukrainian,” just as there is a king’s English. Impure forms of Ukrainian and mixtures with Russian are relegated to low status. But what exactly gets considered pure and impure leaves room for debate, making language ideology a field of contestation.
The generally disempowered position of women in Ukrainian society is something that deserves more critical attention. Soviet ideology perpetuated the idea of equal access to all jobs for men and women and the responsibility to work outside the home for both sexes, but in practice this did not result in equality (Pavlychko 1996, Gal & Kligman 2000). Even in Soviet ideology and symbolism, women were frequently relegated to secondary, more backward roles. A good example is a famous Soviet sculpture that genders the components of Soviet insignia by depicting a woman holding a sickle (symbolizing agriculture and peasantry) next to a man holding aloft a hammer (a symbol of industry and progress).

Postwar labor needs, along with the communist ideology of gender equality and all persons working to the best of their abilities, pushed most women to work outside the home. Even so, by and large women continued to carry the responsibility for doing most of the work inside the home (Rubchak 1996:329–330; Wanner 1998:112; Gal & Kligman 2000:48). There are certainly exceptions, but the general trend is clear. Despite some token success stories, women tended to be excluded from more prestigious jobs, under the assumption that their real duty was to bear children, manage the home, and care for their husbands. Generous provisions for maternity leave made bosses reluctant to hire women for important, better-paying jobs (as expressed in my interviews; see also Gal & Kligman 2000:49). Now women’s weak position in the labor market has become exacerbated by the post-Soviet economic crisis (Pavlychko 1996:312).

In the past decade, many women have turned to sexual work, and there are many stories of sexual enslavement, particularly of women who try to seek opportunities abroad (Specter 1998). Within the country, there is an increased atmosphere of objectification and exploitation of women, with pornographic materials abundantly visible, job ads explicitly specifying physical traits and requiring lack of sexual inhibitions, and no recourse against sexual harassment at work (on the similar situation in Russia, see Hockstader 1995; Bridger & Kay 1996:28–32). Furthermore, in some conversations with women in Ukraine, I found them rejecting feminism along with the Soviet-era ideology that suppressed sexuality and depicted women as masculinized tractor drivers. As Pavlychko writes, “Feminism and emancipation are now political dirty words” (1996:306). The women I spoke with stressed weakness, the cultivation of beauty, and nurturing husband and family as their ideal of “femininity.” Although their views are by no means universal in Ukrainian society, they are part of a general return to a traditionalism that defines women’s responsibility as homemaking, and men as providers (Lissyutkina 1993; Wanner 1998:66, 112–118; Gal & Kligman 2000:84–85).

The symbolic linkage of women with motherhood and domestic responsibilities has been elaborated in national ritual and education in independent Ukraine.
Women are suffering worse in losing jobs and pay (Hockstader 1995; Pavlychko 1996:312; Gal & Kligman 2000:73), but many women embrace the ideology that excludes them from paid employment and social power (Verdery 1996:81; Gal & Kligman 2000:85). However, as I show in the data presented below, many women reject this traditionalism in their language attitudes and linguistic behavior. The relationship between overt attitudes and behaviors merits further research.

In the return to traditionalism, women are seen as responsible for maintaining linguistic and cultural traditions (Pavlychko 1996; Rubchak 1996; Gal & Kligman 2000:26). Leaders of women’s associations in Ukraine embrace this ideology in statements that they must first liberate the nation before they liberate women, and that it is women’s role to revitalize the “moral spirit” of the Ukrainian people in order to save the nation (Rubchak 1996:317–18). Preservation of the Ukrainian language is a central part of these endeavors (Pavlychko 1996:308). Language also figures in the new post-Soviet mythology of the Berehynia, the ‘Hearth-mother’ who is “the perfect Ukrainian woman, the spirit of the Ukrainian home, the ideal mother, who played an important role in Ukrainian history, the preserver of language and national identity” (Pavlychko 1996:311). This ideology is further exemplified in the epigraph of a recent article (Chaban 1994), which quotes from the autobiography of a writer from the 1920s, Ostap Vyshnia: “I am often asked where I got my language. I got my language from my mother’s nipple. That is the inexhaustable well of language. Take notice of this, mothers, and your children will never need to be Ukrainianized.”

Are women accepting the cultural burden of maintaining the “authentic” linguistic traditions and shunning what is nonstandard, or are they spurred by the desire for status? Both these factors likely underlay the gender inequality in an event I observed in Ukraine on 12 May 2000. At Kyiv State University, scheduled conference proceedings on language politics that were already getting a late start were delayed by another hour in order to announce awards and distribute flowers and books for the best performance in a dictation. The “general university dictation in the Ukrainian language” (zahal’no-universytets’kyj dyktant ukrajins’koji movy) was part of a new effort to monitor and reward knowledge of the Ukrainian language. I found the usefulness of this exercise questionable, given that Ukrainian is a language that, like Spanish, is very regular in the correspondence of graphemes to phonemes; thus, performance in the dictation relied on the distinction of some close vowels, doubled consonants, and proper punctuation. Native Russian speakers, for whom Ukrainian is a second language, might be disadvantaged owing to the different phonological and orthographic patterns of Russian. The rector of the university announced that 78% of students passed the exercise, and thirty received awards for perfect performance. Out of the thirty awardees, only five were men.

This gender inequality in performance supports the idea that women are more likely to try to perfect institutionally valued linguistic skills. In the awards cer-
emony, to those who did not win awards, the rector of the university wished that they might “master this tsarina of reading/writing” (ovolodity otseju tsarytseju hramotoju).

Thus, he evoked the image of literary (written/read) language as an elite woman to be taken control of, possessed, mastered. In his comment, women were metonymically transposed with literary language. While women themselves might excel at the institutionally approved language, they also become embodiments of the language and tradition.

In sum, two factors are likely to create differences in how men and women use and think of language as a resource in Ukraine: the economic and the cultural. Social and economic positionings and opportunities in Ukraine are gendered, and different skills and choices in language use are also prescribed and inculcated in the cultural ideology of gender roles. The economic and cultural factors sometimes reinforce and sometimes counter one another, as I point out below in examining some of the gender differences in my data.

LANGUAGE ATTITUDE SURVEY AND MATCHED GUISE TEST

Methodology and sampling

During fieldwork in Ukraine from November 1994 to November 1995, I conducted a survey and matched guise language attitude test (explained below) with 2,000 people as part of my study of language politics. The purposes of the survey and test were to document conscious and implicit attitudes toward language, and to examine how these are shaped by ethnicity, gender, age, regional background, education, and other factors, in order to obtain a deeper understanding of the tensions at play in the radically changing post-Soviet society of Ukraine.

I administered the test and survey in the cities and surrounding regions of Lviv, Kyiv, and Dnipropetrovsk. As explained above, these cities represent three areas – West, Center, and East – that differ in history, demographics, and prevailing language ideologies. I conducted the research with high school students, university students, teachers, researchers at scientific institutes, and some other groups. I ended up concentrating on institutional contexts because arranging the testing with other groups (such as dairy workers and construction workers) proved very difficult. In this study, I analyze the responses of the high school and university students, who comprise the bulk of my sample.

I tried to obtain similar representation from each region. I arranged testing sometimes by approaching directors, teachers, and professors myself, and sometimes after an introduction from a mutual acquaintance. To collect data from high school students, in each area I conducted the research in five schools: two in the city center, one in a non-central bedroom community, one in a village, and an additional school either in a non-central part of the city or a nearby village. In each of the city centers, I arranged testing in one school where the primary language of instruction was officially Ukrainian, and in one where it was Russian.
The rural schools all have Ukrainian as the primary language. I aimed for about fifty students from each school, which meant conducting the test with two or three classes. However, owing to variations in class size and scheduling possibilities, the numbers of respondents tested ranged from 21 to 73 from each school. The grades chosen (from 8 to 11) depended on scheduling availability as determined by the principal and teachers. The total numbers of high school students tested in each region were 239 in Kyiv, 186 in Dnipropetrovsk, and 278 in Lviv.

In this article, the sample discussed also includes university students from various disciplines in higher educational institutions in each city. In Dnipropetrovsk, I worked with a total of 337 university and institute students, majoring in accounting (“economists”\textsuperscript{5}), history, mechanical mathematics, medicine, metallurgy, mining, pedagogical psychology, and veterinary medicine. In Kyiv, I worked with 224 university students, majoring in folklore, foreign languages, history, law, music, and physics. In Lviv, 375 university students represented the disciplines of history, law, medicine, physical education, physics, and psychology. Although different disciplinary regimes sometimes correlate with differences in language use and ideology, in this time of sociolinguistic turbulence it is difficult to characterize them definitively. Also, any disciplinary influence on language attitudes would be limited for university students, since they have been exposed to this influence for a relatively short portion of their lives.

The high school students and university students taken together (\(N = 1,639\)) were aged 13 to 27, with a few younger and a few older students (average age 17.5).\textsuperscript{6} When asked to write it on a blank line, 95% of these respondents designated their nationality as either Ukrainian or Russian. The proportions of each nationality in the sample to be analyzed here are 83% Ukrainians, 12% Russians, and 5% other designations. I focus on the two major ethnic groups and use their ethnic self-designations as axes of comparison, resulting in a sample of 704 Ukrainian women, 651 Ukrainian men, 118 Russian women, and 84 Russian men (total \(N = 1,557\)).

Overall, according to the 1989 census data, Ukraine had a population of about 52 million, 73% percent of whom are considered ethnic Ukrainians, 22% Russians, and 5% other ethnic groups (Table 1). The nationality statistics of the December 2001 census, showing a decreased population of 49 million, had not yet been released when this article went to press. The difference between my sample (described above) and the 1989 census figures may reflect sampling procedures, or a changing tendency in people’s choice of ethnicity/nationality (Tables 2 and 3). Ukraine’s independent status probably led more people to identify with Ukrainian nationality regardless of familial ethnic background, counter to the predominant Soviet trend, in which Russian nationality was favored. I am aware of one example that occurred in 1992, when a man in his early twenties from an eastern (Russian-language-dominant) Ukrainian city chose to list “Ukrainian” as his passport nationality, to the surprise of his parents, who are both listed as “Russian” (although his mother had a Ukrainian mother and Russian father).
The nationality category in passports has since been eliminated. The complicated picture of just who is the linguistic minority in this country is portrayed in a recent sociological study showing that 40% of the population are ethnic Ukrainians who prefer to speak Ukrainian, 33% are ethnic Ukrainians who prefer to speak Russian, and 20% are ethnic Russians who prefer to speak Russian (Martyniuk 2000).

The research that I conducted included a matched guise test, followed by survey questions on personal background and overt evaluations of language. I analyze data from both the test and survey here. The matched guise test, originally developed in 1960 (Lambert et al. 1960), allows researchers to study language attitudes in bilingual or bidialectal situations. This test has since been modified and used to study language attitudes in various contexts (see Fasold 1984:149–58). In the test I administered in Ukraine in 1995, respondents were asked to evaluate character traits of people based on their voice quality on tape recordings. The key to the test is that respondents do not know that they are evaluating each speaker twice, but in different languages. The recording that was evaluated presented six speakers, each reading once in Ukrainian and once in Russian, and one speaker reading in Ukrainian and English. The speech samples were presented in mixed order so that speaker repetition was not evident. The structure of this test allows the researcher to control for individual voice quality, which permits the study of the subconscious association of languages with character traits.

The survey questions that followed asked respondents to provide background information, including their year of birth, sex, regional background, whether their background was predominantly urban or rural, nationality, native language, and the native language of their mother and father. Next were questions asking for evaluations of language quality and language proficiency. While the matched guise test documented subconscious language attitudes, the survey questions documented conscious, overt evaluations of language. I begin with analysis of the overt evaluations before proceeding to the subconscious matched guise test data.

**TABLE 1. Nationality distributions according to 1989 census in the cities and oblasts surveyed. Sources: Arel 1993: 107, 113–4, 178; Shablij 1994:165.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lviv city</th>
<th>Lviv oblast</th>
<th>Kyiv city</th>
<th>Kyiv oblast</th>
<th>Dnipropetrovsk city</th>
<th>Dnipropetrovsk oblast</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>72.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 2. Nationality distributions of the 1995 test sample: high school students in urban and suburban/rural schools, by region (percentage figures are rounded).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Urban schools (N = 373)</th>
<th>Suburban/Rural schools (N = 330)</th>
<th>Total schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lviv</td>
<td>Kyiv</td>
<td>Dnipro.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukr./Rus.</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 3. Nationality distributions of the 1995 test sample: high school students, university students, and student totals (percentage figures are rounded).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High school students (N = 703)</th>
<th>University students (N = 936)</th>
<th>All students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lviv</td>
<td>Kyiv</td>
<td>Dnipro.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukr./Rus.</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ethnicity and gender in language criticism

In the first analysis, I consider how students answered a survey question in which I asked them to “Give a general evaluation of how people speak Ukrainian where you live (the locality or city).” This question assesses how critical or supportive respondents are of the language used around them. It solicits judgments of language in use – not of an idealized Ukrainian language, which might be evaluated differently.

The implications of the answers to this question can be interpreted in several ways. On the one hand, considering a language to be of better quality is tantamount to asserting the authority of that language and its associated social and political identity. Also, if the given language is symbolic of one’s own ethnic group, a higher evaluation of quality can indicate more self-confidence, which plays out in an interaction to assert higher social status. On the other hand, giving a lower evaluation takes away authority and legitimacy from a language. When a respondent’s identity is linked to a language, low evaluations of quality can indicate less linguistic security and low self-esteem.

In answering the question about how well people speak, respondents had to choose from five answers: very well or purely, rather well, fairly, rather badly, or very badly. In my analyses, these answers correspond to a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 as the most positive evaluation. The survey also included the same question regarding Russian. Here I consider the intersections of the factors of ethnicity and gender in the responses (Tables 4 and 5). I provide information on statistical significance levels in my discussion of this non-random sample for descriptive purposes only.

Table 4 presents the responses of students evaluating the quality of Ukrainian language in their area, subdivided by respondents’ sex and ethnicity. The difference between evaluations by Ukrainian males and females is highly significant (F = 13.4, p = 0.0003).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of respondents</th>
<th>Percentage of respondents choosing each possible answer:</th>
<th>Mean value</th>
<th>Std. dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very badly (1)</td>
<td>Rather badly (2)</td>
<td>Fairly well (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian women (N = 117)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian men (N = 83)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukr. women (N = 700)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian men (N = 642)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The difference between evaluations by Ukrainian males and females is highly significant (F = 13.4, p = 0.0003).
in choice of response category can be summed up by looking at the means of the numerical values of the responses. For ethnic Ukrainians, the mean response is 3.20 for women and 3.37 for men, values that are both slightly above average and are significantly different from one another ($p = 0.0003$). The mean response for ethnic Russians of both sexes is 2.90, just below average. The difference between these two ethnic groups is significant ($p < 0.0001$). Young people of Ukrainian ethnicity show more support for Ukrainian than do Russians. Ethnic Russians are more critical, and thus less supportive of the authority of the Ukrainian language in their region. There appears to be ethnolinguistic loyalty, leading people to give a higher evaluation to the titular language of their own ethnic group (this is confirmed in the evaluations of Russian language in Table 5, discussed below).

In explaining this pattern, it should be noted that Russians are not necessarily more knowledgeable about Ukrainian than are other respondents, as was evident in answers to another survey question in which Russians claimed significantly lower understanding of Ukrainian than did ethnic Ukrainians (Bilaniuk n.d.). Yet the typically more limited proficiency of ethnic Russians in Ukrainian did not prevent them from being more critical of it than were ethnic Ukrainians. It appears to be not so much an issue of discerning correctness, as a political statement. By rating the quality of the Ukrainian language lower, Russians also discredit its (local) validity and authority. As I show elsewhere in a regional analysis, in western Ukraine this constitutes resistance to the now dominant status of Ukrainian there, while in eastern Ukraine it reinforces the largely unchanged lower status of Ukrainian (Bilaniuk n.d.). The question was phrased specifically regarding language in the respondents’ area of residence, and thus it reflects the perceived authority of the language in use in a specific city or village. Further research is necessary to determine how the perception of local language may differ from attitudes toward an idealized Ukrainian language.

### TABLE 5. Student’s survey answers evaluating how well Russian is spoken in the respondent’s area of residence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of respondents</th>
<th>Very badly</th>
<th>Rather badly</th>
<th>Fairly well</th>
<th>Rather well</th>
<th>Very well</th>
<th>Mean value</th>
<th>Std. dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian women (N = 112)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian men (N = 83)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukhr. women (N = 698)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian men (N = 638)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In looking at evaluations of Russian language (Table 5), female Ukrainian respondents rated it somewhat higher than they rated Ukrainian (a difference of +0.18). This shows that young Ukrainian women as a group are more willing to recognize the legitimacy and authority of Russian than of Ukrainian in their region. The Ukrainian men evaluate Ukrainian and Russian languages almost the same (Russian was evaluated only 0.01 point lower). Not surprisingly, Russian respondents on average give the Russian language much higher evaluations (3.87–3.88) than they do Ukrainian, a difference of almost a whole point (+0.97 to +0.98). This shows Russians of both sexes to be more self-confident about their titular ethnic language than are Ukrainians of theirs. Although Russian language in Ukraine is often criticized for having nonstandard phonology, in their answers Russians are clearly choosing to assert the value, and by extension the authority, of their language. It also appears that Ukrainians do not reject this authority, although they do not support it as strongly as do ethnic Russians.

When considering how gender affects language criticism, we find that there is little or no sex difference within ethnic groups in evaluations of Russian language (Table 5). There is, however, a significant difference in evaluations of Ukrainian language, but only among ethnic Ukrainians (Table 4). Ukrainian women are more critical of Ukrainian language quality than men. Why might this be so? One possible factor is that Ukrainian respondents have more at stake than Russians do in evaluating Ukrainian language because it is explicitly associated with their ethnic identity. The status of the Ukrainian language probably has little impact on the social status of Russians living there, particularly in the immediate post-Soviet period, when their ethnic identity is still very strongly linked with Russia. However, we should expect a gender difference to emerge among ethnic Ukrainians if young men and women are differently affected by language status in respect to their social power and standing.

Under the Eckert/Bourdieu model, the changing, unstable status of Ukrainian would make it a less useful site through which women could realize their social aspirations. In 1995, Ukrainian had been the official state language for 6 years, but in practice its use was still limited, and it had not shed its associations with low culture and peasantry. Meanwhile, the status of Russian has remained stable despite political changes. Although Russian is not the official language of the state of Ukraine, it is still used by many officials, and it is the official language of Ukraine’s large and powerful neighbor to the north. Throughout the former Soviet Union, Russian is still considered a language of power, high culture, and science, even though it has become more politicized as a symbol of ethnic allegiance.

While Russian has a well-established and institutionalized standard, the Ukrainian standard is poorly institutionalized. People in positions of power often know Ukrainian poorly. Even if they can speak it, many public officials and professors use heavily Russified Ukrainian, or nonstandard Ukrainian dialect varieties (usually learned during childhood summers in villages, since they had
little opportunity to use literary urban Ukrainian). Such instances reinforce the “impure” and rural connotations of Ukrainian and undermine its legitimacy as the official state language. Furthermore, the previously limited use of Ukrainian in administrative and scientific fields has left much specialized terminology to be elaborated. The development of terminology has provoked many disagreements, which undermine the sense of an established standard and thus drag down the status of the language.

If women’s social positions make them more sensitive to symbolic and linguistic capital (as Eckert 1998 suggests), this should lead them to be more critical of a language of questionable status than men would be. Such an explanation is in keeping with the data presented here. Although a lower evaluation of a language can undermine its authority, this response also reflects dissatisfaction with the current state and status of the language. Even women who are otherwise patriotic can be more critical of Ukrainian language, thus expressing their desire for a better established and socially validated language, if it is to be linked to their social identity. Even though Ukrainian has become more prestigious than before (see Bilaniuk 1997a), and knowing it is definitely an asset, outside of Western Ukraine knowing Russian is at least as important. Until recently, knowing Russian was a much greater mark of high status than knowing Ukrainian, since in the Soviet system better education and better jobs were all associated with Russian language. In addition to this political/economic explanation, the cultural milieu in which women are expected to be guardians of the purity of their language can reinforce women’s more critical stance toward Ukrainian.

The value of Ukrainian would be a lesser issue in the social status of ethnic Russians, unless they felt partly “Ukrainian” and believed that they had something at stake in upholding the value of Ukrainian. This is certainly possible if being “Ukrainian” were to take on the primary meaning of citizenship and become secondarily an ethnic descriptor. Although this is the aim of many Ukrainian politicians, it is not yet established, and the independent Ukrainian state had only existed for four years at the time of this research. Interethnic conflict is still evident in disagreements over language use and policies, which reinforce the naturalized linking of ethnicities and titular languages. Many Russians in Ukraine do feel affinity for their country of residence, but many find the new official support for Ukrainian language and independent identity threatening to the status and prestige of their own language and ethnicity. It is reasonable to assume that many Russians would prefer to maintain the Soviet-era status quo in which Russian was the most prestigious language and identity (a fact that was poorly masked by the oxymoronic Soviet slogan that labeled Russian ethnicity as “first among equals”). Thus, one possible explanation for the lack of a gender difference among ethnic Russian respondents is that they are not particularly engaged with the changing status of Ukrainian.
Gender and the factors of regional and urban/rural background. Interesting patterns emerge when the responses are broken down by the urban or rural background of respondents (Table 6). The trend of women being more critical than men in evaluating the quality of Ukrainian is twice as strong among people whose background is in villages, as opposed to those from major cities (although the trend is significant in cities as well). The trend is even stronger among Ukrainians whose background is in towns or small cities that are not oblast capitals. Sixty-eight respondents who could not be clearly categorized have been excluded from this analysis.

An analysis of urban/rural background among Russians is problematic because so few Russians live in villages (my sample included only 14 villagers who identified themselves as Russians – 11 females and 3 males, as compared to 379 Russian small town and city dwellers). While there were no statistically significant differences, the difference by sex was greater among the Russian villagers than among the urban dwellers. Among the villagers, the females were more critical of Ukrainian language quality, in keeping with the trend among ethnic Ukrainians. This suggests that the lack of gender difference in evaluations of Ukrainian language among Russians is due partly to their predominantly urban background, a hypothesis that warrants further examination.

The response patterns by rural/urban background suggest that the gender difference in ideologies is a product of the “periphery.” Following the ideas of Gal 1979 and Bourdieu (1991:50), women in peripheral areas, especially villages, are likely to be particularly sensitive to language as a factor in social mobility. If wielding a more widely validated language gives women a major avenue of social advancement, it makes sense that women would be more critical of the local language around them. By evaluating the language of their village more positively, women would also be validating the language and prestige of their village.

*Mean female evaluation minus mean male evaluation.

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**TABLE 6. Ukrainian respondents by urban/rural background: Mean evaluations of Ukrainian language quality.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent’s background</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean eval. (1–5 scale)</th>
<th>Std. dev.</th>
<th>Mean resp. difference*</th>
<th>F ratio</th>
<th>p value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Village</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>male</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small town</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>male</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>male</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Mean female evaluation minus mean male evaluation.
men. Russian language, largely an urban phenomenon in Ukraine, would not play a role in this rural dynamic.

Many factors may shape the general trend discussed here. For example, women could be evaluating language as an avenue for advancement through marriage. Why this would be a lesser option for men remains to be determined. Researchers have argued that men’s status is more tied to their material wealth and occupation, and that their ethnic identity is socially more fixed and depends less on whom they associate with than does that of women (Gal 1979, Woolard 1996). Even if perceptions of men’s social identities are less influenced by their companions’ identities, men’s attitudes are nevertheless shaped through involvement in local solidarity networks. It would have been interesting to find out whether Ukrainian men were more supportive of Ukrainian before perestroika, in a way similar to the “covert prestige” documented by Trudgill 1998 in Norwich. Now, however, support for Ukrainian no longer needs to be covert; it can be an open effort to claim power.

If women are more sensitive to how they are defined by symbolic capital, their more critical stance toward their local Ukrainian language is also evidence of a more active role in evaluating and shaping the quality of their language, which is reinforced in cultural ideals of women’s linguistic and traditional responsibilities. One could say that women are policing the definition of the prestige variant. This interpretation directly contradicts Bourdieu’s suggestion that women are simply “inclined towards docility with regard to the dominant usages” (1991:50). The language evaluations of both men and women reflect their struggles to shape linguistic value, to claim authority and validity, to resist domination, and otherwise to establish an advantageous position in the symbolic systems of their lives.

Subconscious evaluations of language

To this point, my discussion has centered on the active and conscious evaluations of language that I documented through survey questions. Next, I shift the focus to less conscious language attitudes that are implicit in people’s reactions to speech that they hear. As explained above, I collected data on these reactions by means of the matched guise language attitude test, which I administered along with the survey.

The following analyses examine both differences in evaluations of male and female speakers, and differences between male and female respondents. As I will show, there is striking regularity in gender patterning in the subconscious evaluations, which adds another dimension to our understanding of the gendering and ethnic differentiation of conscious evaluations.

Language attitudes by sex of speaker. First, I analyze how the gender of speakers affects how they are evaluated, based on the Ukrainian-Russian matched guise test. Figure 1 presents graphs of mean evaluations of matched guise test traits by all student respondents, broken down by speaker sex, grouping the three
female speakers together and the three male speakers together. High school and university student respondents of all ethnic backgrounds are included in this analysis (N = 1,639).

For all twelve traits evaluated, there is a strikingly regular trend of higher evaluation of the traits in the Russian guise of female readers and the Ukrainian

---

**FIGURE 1:** Matched-guise evaluations by reader sex.
guise of male readers: One can see that pattern clearly in Figure 1, in that the mean female values are always to the left of the mean male values (the left direction of the graphs indicates stronger association of a quality with Russian, while values more to the right on the plots are more strongly associated with Ukrainian). In the case of evaluations of self-confidence, absolute values of the means for both sexes favor Russian, while both sexes are more strongly evaluated for hard-workingness in Ukrainian; however, the relative trend holds true even for these traits. An examination of the data broken down by respondents’ sex and ethnicity upholds the same trend, although the absolute values vary. While Russians tend to favor Russian language over Ukrainian, regardless of who the respondent is, female speakers are always given higher evaluations in their Russian guise relative to male speakers.

Since all of the traits are positive (except perhaps pride, if it is taken as haughtiness), we can ask why it is that women are more positively evaluated in their Russian guises, while men are more positively evaluated when speaking Ukrainian. This trend runs directly counter to the mythology of women as the protectors of national traditions in Ukraine. One explanation for this gender patterning is the persistence of the connotations of Russian as a prestigious, urban language for women. These symbolic connotations may be less strong for men, since even men from villages had the opportunity to learn Russian during their mandatory army service.

The more positive overall evaluation of the three men is due partly to the perceived “purity” of the language of individual speakers. Two of the three male readers had a strong Ukrainian accent in their Russian, while one did not. The same two out of three men read in Ukrainian with standard Ukrainian phonology. Since language with standard phonology tends to be evaluated more highly, this explains some of the more positive marks given to the Ukrainian guises of the three men taken together. The one man who read in Russian-accented Ukrainian was evaluated about the same in each language (see Figure 2 and discussion below). The patterning of the evaluations of the men makes it all the more remarkable that women tend to be evaluated more positively in Russian, even when their Russian is “less pure” (i.e., has the phonology typical of standard Ukrainian) than their Ukrainian reading. I explain this further in the analysis of attitudes toward individual speakers.

Further light can be shed on the different evaluations of traits by speaker gender if we consider the specifics of individual speakers’ readings. Matched guise tests are designed to control for speaker idiosyncrasies, in that the same speaker is evaluated twice, once in each language. Although this assumption of control allows for the general comparison of attitudes associated with given languages, I show here that the examination of individual differences can also be fruitful. My analysis also suggests caution in making generalized interpretations of matched guise tests, in that small variations in language can carry great symbolic import.
One of the most important factors is perceived linguistic purity, which is often discussed in matched guise test analyses as a result of the speaker’s “native language.” That is, if speakers speak with standard phonology in a given language, this is assumed to correlate with their being “native speakers” of that language.

**Figure 2:** Evaluations of individual readers. Every recorded speaker was evaluated for each of 12 traits (1 [lowest] to 5 [highest]). The score shown here is the mean for all respondents (N = 1,639) of evaluations of a speaker’s Ukrainian guise minus evaluations of a speaker’s Russian guise. A positive score indicates higher evaluation of a trait in a speaker’s Ukrainian guise, while a negative score indicates higher evaluation of a trait in the speaker’s Russian reading.

One of the most important factors is perceived linguistic purity, which is often discussed in matched guise test analyses as a result of the speaker’s “native language.” That is, if speakers speak with standard phonology in a given language, this is assumed to correlate with their being “native speakers” of that language,
and they then exhibit nonstandard phonology (the “accent” of their “native language”) in the other language being studied. However, the complexity of the linguistic backgrounds of individuals in Ukraine makes it difficult to use “native language” as a meaningful category. For example, a common case would be someone who grew up with Ukrainian at home but had schooling and a profession dominated by Russian, married a Russian speaker, has a child studying in a Ukrainian language school, and is now using both languages or mixed language in the home. Also, many Russophones in Ukraine (who may consider their native language to be Russian) speak Russian with marked Ukrainian pronunciation. Thus, it is necessary to discuss the specifics of each speaker’s readings to examine the role of linguistic purity.

In addition to the issue of linguistic purity, the tone or style of reading plays a role. Even if speakers retain the same tone in both readings, particular ways of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trait</th>
<th>Respondents grouped by ethnicity and sex</th>
<th>Mean Evals.</th>
<th>Stand. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intelligent</td>
<td>Ukr. males</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukr. females</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rus. males</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rus. females</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultured</td>
<td>Ukr. males</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukr. females</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rus. males</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rus. females</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritative</td>
<td>Ukr. males</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukr. females</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rus. males</td>
<td>-0.65</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rus. females</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleasant</td>
<td>Ukr. males</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukr. females</td>
<td>-0.84</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rus. males</td>
<td>-1.02</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rus. females</td>
<td>-1.21</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 3: Evaluations of English vs. Ukrainian guises by respondent sex and ethnicity.
speaking may be associated with different character stereotypes in the two languages. For example, if a reader has a serious tone, this may sound more normal or appropriate in one language than in the other, producing patterns of evaluation different than if both readings had been done in a jovial tone. Suprasegmental features of the readings, such as speed and intonation, can give a reading the flavor of seriousness, levity, or some other tone that can be differentially valued as appropriate or not in different languages, for speakers of different genders. Additionally, it is nearly impossible to obtain recordings with identical timing and tone, and small differences in these areas can also affect how a speaker is evaluated. To minimize this impact, my choice of samples for the test was based largely on the equivalency of readings in both languages, but it may still play a role.

Figure 2 presents evaluations of four traits for the six individual speakers. Four traits out of the twelve were chosen to present some of the patterning concisely. I consider intelligence, culturedness, authoritativeness, and pleasantness as general positive values; some of the other traits such as honesty, hard-workingness, happiness, and propensity to joke require further explanation in terms of cultural-historic associations (Bilaniuk 1998a).

In order to characterize the individual readers and their readings, I consulted with linguist and non-linguist colleagues. I also draw on my own knowledge of their linguistic background and assessment of their performance. Some of the relevant characteristics are as follows:

Female 1 (F1) is a female in her twenties, a linguistics graduate student who grew up fully bilingual in a southeastern Ukrainian city. Both of her readings are fluent, colorfully intoned, and with carefully enunciated literary standard pronunciation. Of all the readers, she is the least rushed, spending 76 seconds and 72 seconds on her Ukrainian and Russian readings, respectively. Her Russian accent is a neutral standard, not distinguishable as pertaining to a particular region. Her Ukrainian pronunciation is of the central dialect, which is widely considered the most desirable (as opposed to western Ukrainian speech), although a more rounded than usual pronunciation of the vowel in sport, sportom does hint at closeness to Russian phonology.

Female 2 (F2) is a female in her fifties. Her Ukrainian reading is standard but marked as western Ukrainian; her Russian reading has many Ukrainian phonological features – a strong “Ukrainian accent.” Both of her readings sound matter-of-fact and rushed: Her intonation is flatter than F1’s, and the speed is relatively fast (57 seconds in Ukrainian, 58 in Russian – about 25% faster than F1). She gives the impression that she just wants to get the reading over with, and does not convey any desire to entertain.

Female 3 (F3) is a female in her fifties. Her Russian reading is a regionally unmarked Soviet standard. Her Ukrainian reading is very strongly marked with Russian phonological features. Both readings are colorfully intoned and casual, and she is not rushed, taking a bit more time in Ukrainian (72 seconds) than in Russian (66 seconds).
Male 1 (M1) is a male in his fifties. His Ukrainian reading is in a central standard; his Russian reading has many Ukrainian phonological features. The tone of both readings is somewhat amused (one listener remarked that he must be smiling while he read). He does not sound rushed (66 seconds in Ukrainian, 69 seconds in Russian).

Male 2 (M2) is a male in his early forties. His Ukrainian reading is standard but marked as western Ukrainian; his Russian reading has many Ukrainian phonological features. His tone is earnest. He is not rushed but evenly paced, much like M1 (65 seconds in Ukrainian, 68 seconds in Russian).

Male 3 (M3) is a male in his early twenties, from Kyiv. His Russian language is a neutral standard, but his Ukrainian language has occasional features from Russian (a slight “Russian accent”). His Ukrainian reading is somewhat more careful and less casual-sounding than his Russian reading. Both readings are faster than the other men’s (Ukrainian taking 60 seconds and Russian 55 seconds).

In summary, F1 and M1 have the most “standard,” central Ukrainian readings; F2 and M2 have Western-accented Ukrainian; and F3 and M3 have Russian-accented Ukrainian (much more marked for the woman than for the man). The Russian language of F2, M1, and M2 is marked with Ukrainian pronunciation; F1, F3, and M3 read with standard Russian phonology.

In Figure 2, mean evaluations are plotted such that stronger associations with Ukrainian guises appear farther to the right, while stronger associations with Russian guises appear farther to the left. Figure 2 shows that F1 is always to the right of F2, who is to the right of F3 in all cases except “pleasantness”; and, in all cases, M1 is to the right of M2, who is to the right of M3. Below I explain possible reasons for this patterning.

Given the trend discussed above, in which women are more positively evaluated in Russian in absolute terms, the young female balanced bilingual (F1) stands out in that she is more positively evaluated in Ukrainian for her culturedness, and to a slight degree for intelligence and pleasantness. Both of her readings are equally “pure,” and so the higher marks for her Ukrainian suggest that such performance in this language is particularly valued. F1’s Ukrainian reading is in a fluent, well-enunciated central standard, and she emotes and intones in a way that exhibits a desire to entertain and engage. This supports my interpretation that the Ukrainian language has gained in status – but only a very literary, entertaining, and refined-sounding Ukrainian. My data show that women are highly evaluated for culturedness in Ukrainian only if they achieve this ideal. As I argue below, perfunctory rapid reading and Russian-accented Ukrainian do not achieve high marks. Evaluations of F1’s authoritativeness also show that no matter how literary her Ukrainian, the literary Russian she speaks is still felt to be more the language of power. In the case of authority, F1 was evaluated more consistently with the other female readers, who were always more positively evaluated in their Russian guises.

In terms of purity, the Ukrainian reading of M1 is similar to that of F1: It is a standard literary Ukrainian with colorful intonation. M1’s reading is more casual
(less carefully enunciated) than F1’s, and he sounds amused. Unlike F1, the Russian guise of M1 has a Ukrainian accent (which is significant because the mean values plotted are a result of comparison of Russian versus Ukrainian guises). Thus, in addition to the high value of pure, entertainingly read Ukrainian, the very strong association of the traits with M1’s Ukrainian guise is also due to the “impurity” (Ukrainian accent) of his Russian.

A similar pattern is evident for M2, whose Ukrainian reading is in a Western standard and whose Russian is heavily accented. The trend favoring Ukrainian is not quite as strong as for M1, suggesting that the Western Ukrainian accent is not quite as favored, but it is still not “impure,” and thus it is more desirable than heavily Ukrainian-accented Russian.

Evaluations of F3 also support the argument that “accented” or “impure” language is less valued than language that sounds “native” and “pure.” F3 reads with a very heavy Russian accent in Ukrainian, and the traits are more strongly associated with her (standard) Russian guise than is the case with the other two women. In evaluations of pleasantness, F3 is to the right of F2, but she is still seen as more pleasant in Russian.

Evaluations of M1, M2, and F3 support the theory that “accented” language is devalued and seen as less intelligent, cultured, authoritative, and pleasant than language that sounds “native.” I now turn to the significant exceptions, F2 and M3.

The only male who speaks in neutral standard Russian and in Russian-accented Ukrainian is M3. His intelligence, culturedness, and pleasantness are less strongly associated with Ukrainian than are those of the other two men, but there is still a slight preference for his Ukrainian guise regarding these traits. Even though the preference is slight, it is surprising in that it goes against the pattern of higher valuations of “purer” language, providing evidence of the high value of Ukrainian for male speakers even beyond considerations of purity. However, M3 is seen as more authoritative (the trait most linked to ideas of power) in his Russian guise. An additional factor to consider is that M3’s Russian reading is the fastest of all samples, and so that fact that he spends 5 seconds longer on the Ukrainian text is significant (the slower a reading overall, the less difference a few seconds make). One evaluator with whom I discussed the samples at length explained that he reacted more negatively when readings were more rushed.

Like those of M3, the readings of F2 sound rushed. Her tone is perfunctory, with no desire to entertain. For all traits, F2 is evaluated more highly in her Russian guise. The fact that F2 reads in markedly Ukrainian-accented Russian suggests that for women, personality and attitude as revealed by intonation and speed are more important than perceived language purity. In their higher evaluations of F2 in Russian, respondents show more acceptance of a perfunctory, serious tone for a Russian-speaking woman than for a Ukrainian-speaking one. A possible explanation is that people are more accustomed to Russian-speaking bureaucrats, and the serious, perfunctory tone of F2’s readings sounds “bureaucratic.”
Although the analysis of individual readings cannot lead to conclusive explanations of the language dynamics, owing to lack of control for various factors, such analysis provides directions for further research, particularly regarding the links between ideologies of language and cultural constructs of gender and the gendering of linguistic/ethnic identities (see Romaine 1996, Echeverría 2000). I did find that language purity correlated with higher evaluations, but significant exceptions reveal that there are more factors at play, including gender and reading style. The analyses above suggest that a Ukrainian-speaking woman will be received more positively if she intones colorfully and shows a desire to engage and entertain her hearers; in contrast, a flat, rushed tone is more palatable in a woman speaking Russian. This evaluation of linguistic styles corresponds to the idealized image of the Ukrainian woman as a nurturer, not as a no-nonsense reporter of facts. For men, however, Ukrainian is positively valued even in a more rushed reading style, even when compared with “purer” Russian speech. Because the analyses above rely on individual speakers, further research is necessary to determine whether these trends are widespread.

Gender differences in attitudes towards English. The final angle of analysis in this examination of language attitudes in Ukraine concerns differences in how women and men evaluated Ukrainian versus English. There were no clear differences by respondent gender in the matched guise test scores comparing Ukrainian versus Russian guises, but an interesting trend is evident in evaluations of the English versus Ukrainian guises of the one male reader who is a native speaker of both languages. For conciseness here, I present and discuss evaluations of only four traits: intelligence, culturedness, authoritativeness, and pleasantness.

Mean evaluations show that all categories of respondents favored English over Ukrainian in absolute terms. Relative comparisons between Ukrainian respondents show that women associate all of these traits more strongly with the English language than do men. The range of statistical significance is as follows: pleasantness $F = 11.7, p = 0.0007$, authoritativeness $F = 8.1, p = 0.005$, culturedness $F = 3.8, p = 0.05$, and intelligence $F = 2.8, p = 0.10$.

For all of these traits, Russians associate them even more strongly with the English guise than do Ukrainians. Among Russian respondents, there is also evidence of a tendency for women to favor English more strongly in evaluating intelligence and pleasantness, but it is men who associate culturedness and authoritativeness more strongly with English than do any other respondents. The gender difference among Russians, however, is not statistically significant for any of the traits ($p$ values ranging from 0.3 to 0.7).

A possible explanation for these patterns can again be found in the theory that women rely more on symbolic capital for their social status. In this case, since Ukrainian is not yet a well-established language of prestige, women (and Ukrainians in particular) find English more attractive and valuable than Ukrainian. Meanwhile, Ukrainian men have a greater reason to support their local language.
Russians, particularly men, vie most directly with Ukrainian men for local authority, and so they would have the most reason to not support Ukrainian, which in daily life is the language most directly challenging the status of Russian.

The reader in question was a man, and thus his voice could have evoked the image of an appropriate partner for female respondents in the student sample. If we assume a heterosexual society in which women seek to improve their status through marriage, the more positive responses of women to the speaker’s English guise make sense, since English unequivocally connotes better economic opportunities.

In any case, the fact that Ukrainian women tend to evaluate a speaker more positively in English than in Ukrainian shows that the cultural paradigm of women as protectors of the Ukrainian nation, language, and traditions is not necessarily accepted by women. It certainly does not correspond to the reality of women’s language attitudes in Ukraine. This suggests that many women do not wholeheartedly accept the ideology of women’s traditionalism, which gives more control to men by limiting the socio-economic mobility of women.

CONCLUSIONS

My research has shown that gender is a significant factor affecting language ideology in Ukraine. The role of gender is by no means clear or simple: It is a complex social construct that intertwines with the constructs of ethnicity, age, profession, class, and other facets of identity. Nevertheless, the patterns of language ideology that I have found can be explained in terms of gender differences in access to social power and status, often consistent with findings elsewhere. For example, my data showing women having more positive attitudes than men toward English is consistent with Gal’s (1998) findings that women are more attracted to a non-local language because it gives them greater opportunities for social advancement.

In this study, I found that economic and political forces sometimes appear to be reinforced by cultural ideologies of women as preservers of tradition, but sometimes these forces are in contradiction. The fact that Ukrainian women were more critical than men of Ukrainian language could be seen as evidence of the former’s “policing” the purity of the language, and thus taking on the burden of maintaining authentic traditions. On the other hand, their criticism could reflect lower valuation of a language of questionable status that does not give them the kinds of opportunities for social advancement that Russian or English can. Although the status of Ukrainian has risen – as we see in the high evaluations of standard Ukrainian speakers, especially men (also see Bilaniuk 1998a) – Russian and English have much more established prestige and provide clearer opportunities for advancement. Ukrainian is not yet institutionally well established, while Russian still retains its connotations of urbanity, education, and social power, and English is associated with the affluent West and political and technological power.

Why would Ukrainian women be more likely to pursue the benefits accorded by Russian and English than are men, as is suggested by their attitudes? Accord-
ing to Eckert 1998 and Bourdieu 1991, this is the result of a stronger linkage of women's status to symbolic and linguistic capital, while men's status depends more on material capital and occupation. This leads women to be more critical of a language of questionable status than men would be. If men's status is defined less by symbolic capital and more by what they have and do, they risk less in supporting a language of questionable status. This does not mean that symbolic capital is irrelevant for men, but they are in a better position than women to take risks in supporting a less prestigious language. Since Russians (and Russian speakers) have disproportionately been in control of administrative power structures in Ukraine, strong support for Ukrainian is a way for Ukrainian men eventually to claim power away from Russians. It is also to the advantage of Ukrainian men to strive to have others value the Ukrainian language, since this supports their own local power. The myth of Ukrainian women as protectors of language and traditions ultimately serves to uphold the power of local Ukrainian men in the current patriarchal system, and to limit women's social mobility away from the local male sphere of control. The gender difference in evaluations was most pronounced in villages, where women were most critical of the local language, corresponding to Gal's (1989) theory that women in peripheral areas are more sensitive to language as a factor in social mobility. At the same time, my data showed that village men are more supportive of their local language, which serves to boost their own local authority, because marrying out is less of an option for them.

After examining the direct evaluations of language, I analyzed language attitudes that are implicit in reactions to speech, as documented by means of a matched guise test. Analysis of the gender of the readers in this test revealed that women are evaluated more positively in their Russian guise, while men are evaluated more positively in their Ukrainian guise. This complements my finding that women are more critical of the Ukrainian language than men are, as my data show that women are socially rewarded more for using Russian than for Ukrainian. This makes sense given the persistence of the connotations of Russian as a prestigious, urban language for women. The prestigious connotations of Russian are likely less strong for men, since even men from villages had the opportunity to learn Russian during army service. By examining the connotations of the specifics of individual readings, I found further explanation for the variation. For example, a very literary and entertainingly read recording was more likely to gain approval for a woman in Ukrainian than was a flat, fast reading. This suggests a linkage between language ideologies and constructs of gender and ethnicity, as argued by Romaine 1996 and Echeverría 2000. Although perceived language purity appears as the main factor shaping evaluations of men, the issue of purity was overridden by enacted personality traits in the case of some women when these did not fit a feminine ideal.

Women have a subordinate position in Ukrainian society, excluded from most political and economic positions of power and disproportionately burdened with household and family responsibilities. The Soviet rhetoric of gender equality had
only allowed a few token women advancement into prestigious public social positions, and now many of the post-Soviet trends further objectify and disempower women and advocate their return to traditional domestic roles. In this context, it is likely that women rely more on symbolic capital for social advancement, while men depend more on their occupation and material capital (consistent with Eckert 1998). This is not to say that men are not concerned with symbolic capital – indeed, they have the most impetus to support their titular ethnic language inasmuch as it will bolster their claims to authority. Meanwhile, mythologies of idealized womanhood depict women as responsible for upholding Ukrainian language and traditions. Women’s more critical stance toward language quality corresponds to a concern for purity and also a recognition of the limitations of Ukrainian language as an avenue to social power. Public power is less accessible to women, and it is strategically wiser for women to support languages of more established status, since they risk more in identifying themselves with a language of low prestige. Thus, Ukrainian women show relatively more support than do Ukrainian men for languages of world status such as English and Russian. Although cultural ideologies play a role in shaping dispositions and behaviors, my data suggest strongly that language attitudes in Ukraine are shaped by people’s strategies for establishing and maintaining higher social status, and their effort to shape the linguistic values around them.

NOTES

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1 On feminism in independent Ukraine, see Bohachevsk’y-Chomiak 1998, Pavlychko 1996, and Rubchak 1996. The development of gender studies in Ukraine is supported by new institutions such as the Kyiv and Kharkiv Centers for Gender Studies.

2 See Bilaniuk 1998a and Laitin 1998 for further examination of language politics in Ukraine in the 1990s.

3 While my English gloss for Ukrainian *hramota* – ‘reading and writing’ – is often referred to as ‘literacy’ in English, there is a different word in Ukrainian, *hramotnist*, which translates more closely to ‘literacy.’ Literacy refers to a degree of skill in reading and writing; *hramota* refers to the actual phenomena of reading and writing.

4 In my research design I particularly benefited from Preston’s (1989) studies of language ideology in the United States and Woolard’s (1989) research in Catalonia.

5 I translate the specialization of “economist” as “accountant,” although the Ukrainian term is somewhat broader, including various inventorying skills. This is generally a female-dominated, underpaid field (Pavlychko 1996:312).

6 The exclusion of the seven individuals whose ages fall outside of the 13–27-year-old range does not affect the data patterning analyzed.
The wording of this response is designed to reflect the equation of purity and quality, which is pervasive in current linguistic discourse in Ukraine. See Bilaniuk n.d. for further discussion.

Bilaniuk n.d. analyzes regional and ethnic variation in language criticism based on the same survey questions.

Even if this was the case in the early post-Soviet period, this may change once Ukraine has been independent for a longer period of time. See Laitin 1998 for discussion of forces affecting ethnic assimilation of Russians in Ukraine.

As noted earlier, there is an accepted standard Ukrainian language, although some aspects are disputed, and knowledge of Ukrainian grammar rules is limited. Indeed, some interviewees told me that there is nobody who speaks pure Ukrainian, or even that there is no such thing. Disputes over recent terminological developments also lead to the perception by nonspecialists that Ukrainian is not fully standardized. In my analysis, I refer to widely held social perceptions of the language, as I encountered them during my fieldwork.

Oblasts are major administrative regions in Ukrainian, of which there are 24, plus the autonomous republic of Krym (Crimea).

For discussion of why self-confidence and hard-workingness are evaluated differently, see Bilaniuk 1997a, 1998a.

The only exceptions were evaluations by Russian women of happiness and propensity to joke, and here the mean evaluation values were extremely close (within 0.03 points).

In both Ukrainian and Russian, inteligennyy connotes not only ‘intelligent’ but also ‘cultured’.

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See Bilaniuk 1998a for a more extensive linguistic analysis of individual readers’ languages.

Although most of the respondents likely did not know English, they were told that the last reading was a translation of the same text as heard before.

See Bilaniuk 1997a, 1998a for analysis of the Ukrainian versus Russian matched guise test data by ethnic and regional factors.

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